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FROZEN
PRE-EMBRYO
PRACTICE IN
MISSOURI
Mary Beck and
L. “Joanna” Beck Wilkinson1

McQueen v. Gadberry2 was an
Eastern District dissolution
dispute over frozen preimplantation embryos formed
from McQueen’s eggs and
Gadberry’s sperm. The St. Louis
County trial court found the
pre-embryos to be marital
property of a special character
and awarded them jointly to
each of the former spouses. The
appellate court affirmed.
McQueen is an important decision because the inding that preembryos are marital property was an issue of irst impression that
afects many Missouri families. Infertility is a common problem,
couples frequently utilize assisted reproductive technologies
(ART) to form families, and the extra frozen pre-implantation
embryos (hereinafter pre-embryos) have fueled increasing legal
disputes. Family law, health law, and estate planning attorneys
should factor pre-embryo disposition into their repertoires.
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The Issue
“[A]s many as a million ‘leftover’ . . . pre-embryos” are in
frozen storage in the United States.3 Nationally, infertility afects
13 percent of couples, male infertility is the cause of infertility
in 33 percent of couples,4 over 12 percent of women sufer
from infertility, and 7.3 million women of ages 15-44 years
have utilized ART.5 ART “includes fertility treatments in which
eggs or embryos are handled in the laboratory (i.e., in vitro
fertilization [IVF] and related procedures).”6 Implicit in ART is
the collection of gametes (ova/eggs and/or sperm) which fertility
clinics may use to form pre-embryos, to freeze before or after
forming pre-embryos, to artiicially inseminate women, and/or
to transfer such pre-embryos to a woman’s uterus.
Couples have choices as to the disposition of their leftover
frozen pre-embryos: “(1) keep them frozen for future use or
indeinitely, (2) discard them by letting them thaw, (3) donate
them to another recipient . . ., or (4) donate them to research.”7
Such designation may also authorize posthumous use of gametes
of embryos by the other progenitor, relatives, or friends of either
progenitor.
Congress passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certiication Act (FCSRCA) in 1992 requiring all U.S. fertility
clinics performing ART procedures to annually report data on
every ART procedure performed to the Centers for Disease
Control.8 In 2013, the last year for which statistics are published,
the CDC reported a national total of 160,521 ART procedures
with the intent to transfer at least one embryo (range: 109 in
Wyoming to 20,299 in California) performed in 467 U.S. fertility
clinics. These procedures resulted in 53,252 live-birth deliveries,
which constituted 1.6 percent of all infants born in the United
States that year.
mobar.org

In 2013, Missouri’s fertility clinics (located in Kansas City,
St. Louis, Creve Coeur, Columbia, St. Peters, and Chesterield)9
reported 2,006 ART procedures, including 1,728 embryo
transfers resulting in 794 pregnancies and 671 live births.10
Conception difers from in vitro fertilization (IVF) in that
conception is “the onset of pregnancy” whereas IVF is a
laboratory procedure in which eggs are fertilized by sperm.11
Following IVF, the resultant pre-embryos may be transferred to
a uterus, frozen, or discarded. The success rate of developing
a pregnancy from transfer of a pre-embryo is statistically equal
whether implanting fresh or frozen pre-embryos.12 Courts
have struggled to legally deine frozen pre-embryos. Tennessee
famously held in Davis v. Davis that frozen pre-embryos are
neither property or person “but occupy an interim category
that entitles them to special respect because of their potential
for human life.”13 By contrast, McQueen, the irst Missouri case
to address the legal status of frozen pre-embryos, deined preembryos as “marital property of a special character.”14
This paper will review the McQueen decision, summarize
the United States pre-embryo case law, and close with
recommendations for Missouri lawyers. “Posthumous
conception” or the parentage of a deceased intended parent
igures into frozen pre-embryo and gamete case law, but this
paper will not examine these cases.
The Missouri Case: McQueen v Gadberry
The Facts
During their marriage, McQueen (wife) and Gadberry
(husband) patronized a St. Louis fertility clinic to harvest their
own gametes to form frozen pre-embryos. This was because
Gadberry’s military deployment complicated their conceiving
children and not because either party had infertility problems,
a factor that played in the court’s balance of interests. The
pre-embryos were transferred to McQueen’s uterus resulting in
the birth of the couple’s twins. The parties’ remaining frozen
pre-embryos were transported to the Fairfax Cryobank storage
facility when their St. Louis clinic closed. The Fairfax Cryobank
required the parties to complete a “Fairfax Cryobank Directive
Regarding the Disposition of Embryos.”15 Gadberry and
McQueen signed the Fairfax directive which purported to give
control of the frozen pre-embryos to McQueen.
Upon the couple’s divorce, McQueen wanted to undergo
embryo transfer with the pre-embryos. Gadberry was opposed to
her plan.
Neither McQueen nor Gadberry “dispute(d) that at the
time the pre-embryos were created, there was no agreement or
express recording of the parties’ intentions regarding the number
of pre-embryos to be created, if or when implantation of any
or all would occur, or any procedure for addressing excess or
unused pre-embryos.”16 However, Gadberry’s and McQueen’s
testimonies conlicted; the wife said the parties discussed giving
the frozen pre-embryos to her in event of dissolution while
husband said no such discussion occurred.
In the dissolution, McQueen sought “custody” of the preembryos and essentially argued that they constituted children
under § 1.205, RSMo, which provides that “[l]ife begins at
conception” and “[u]nborn children have protectable interests
in life.”17 McQueen cited § 188.015, RSMo for its deinitions
of “‘unborn child’ as ‘the ofspring of human beings from the

moment of conception until birth and at every stage of its
biological development, including the human conceptus, zygote,
morula, blastocyst, embryo, and fetus[.]’” and “‘conception’
as ‘the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a sperm of a
male[.]’”18 In the alternative, she argued that the pre-embryos
constituted property controlled by the Fairfax directive, which
required that the court award the pre-embryos to her.
Gadberry argued that awarding the pre-embryos to McQueen
would force him to procreate against his wishes and violate his
fundamental constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection
under the 14th Amendment. Gadberry argued that the preembryos constituted property which should be awarded jointly to
the spouses, who could use them only with signed authorizations
of both parties. Gadberry was agreeable to these four options:
. . . (1) for the frozen pre-embryos to be donated to an
infertile couple, preferably outside of the St. Louis area;
(2) for the frozen pre-embryos to be donated to science;
(3) for the frozen pre-embryos to be destroyed; or (4) for
the frozen pre-embryos to remain in their status quo of
being frozen and stored until the parties could agree
upon a disposition.19
Missouri Analysis and Holding
The trial court extended the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for the couple’s twins to the frozen pre-embryos, found
execution of the Fairfax Cryobank directive lawed and invalid,
held that the frozen pre-embryos were marital property of
special character, and awarded the frozen pre-embryos to the
parties jointly such that no party could decide their disposition
without the other’s consent. McQueen appealed.
The Eastern District Court of Appeals airmed the trial
court’s award of the frozen pre-embryos to the parties jointly.
The court indicated it was “only required to decide whether
frozen pre-embryos have the legal status of children under our
dissolution of marriage statutes”20 and quoted a New Jersey
court that “advances in medical technology have far outstripped
the development of legal principles to resolve the inevitable
disputes arising out of the new reproductive opportunities now
available.”21
The court airmed the trial court’s credibility determination
that the Fairfax Cryobank directive regarding disposition of
the pre-embryos was invalid and unenforceable, and thus
eliminated its use in dividing marital property because “it was
not entered into freely, fairly, knowingly, understandingly, and
in good faith with full disclosure.”22 The directive contained
irregularities in the signature dates vis a vis notarization; the
timing of McQueen’s handwritten notes on the directive were
questionable; and the parties’ testimony conlicted about the
directive and applicable discussions. The court expressly took
“no position on whether gamete providers may enter into a valid
and enforceable agreement [in Missouri] regarding disposition of
frozen pre-embryos” but noted that Florida, Texas, and Oregon
had found such agreements enforceable.23
The court found that the pre-embryos in dispute had not been
transferred to McQueen’s uterus, she was not pregnant, and the
use of the pre-embryos did not constitute her last procreational
chance. Therefore, McQueen’s bodily integrity and her ability
to procreate was not implicated and the pre-embryo disposition
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required balancing the interests of “entirely equal gamete
providers.”24 Allowing McQueen’s use of the pre-embryos would
subject Gadberry to “unwarranted governmental intrusion
into” his procreation and force him to become a parent.25 The
court held that the “declarations in section 1.205 relating to the
potential life of frozen pre-embryos were not suicient to justify
any infringement upon the freedom and privacy of [the parties]”
and airmed the trial court’s award of the pre-embryos to the
parties jointly.26
The court further airmed the trial court’s inding that,
though not explicitly mentioned in Chapter 452, the preembryos did constitute “marital property of a special character”
and not children who have been born and whose “custody,
visitation or support” were at issue.27 Thus, the trial court had
lacked authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for the preembryos.
In his dissent, Judge Dowd cited § 1.205 (life begins at
conception), § 188.010 (conception is the fertilization of the
ovum of a female by a sperm of a male), and § 188.015 (intent
to grant life to all humans, born and unborn) and, importantly,
conlated fertilization and conception stating that “[i]t is
undisputed that conception occurred in this case,”28 and inding
that pre-embryos constitute humans. He posited that Gadberry
had irrevocably released his reproductive rights by providing
semen for the formation of embryos.29 The Supreme Court of
Missouri declined to review the case.30
Sister State Decisions
Fifteen states have rendered decisions in disputes over the
products of ART.31 A three-tiered decision tree has emerged
that the authors use to categorize cases. First, a court evaluates
any cryopreservation agreement typically signed in a fertility
clinic in which the intended parents agreed to a disposition of
frozen pre-implantation embryos. Second, courts balance the
interests of the parties, including whether utilization of the
embryos constitutes one person’s last procreative chance. Third,
at least one court has required contemporaneous mutual consent
despite prior agreement and wife’s last procreative chance. In
these analyses, the existence and applicability of public policy to
the frozen pre-embryos, constitutional rights to privacy, and the
characterization of frozen pre-embryos as person, property, or an
interim category with special characteristics is often discussed.
A fourth category of miscellaneous cases involves pre-embryo
disputes, including the viability of a wrongful death action for
destroyed pre-embryos, the various pre-embryo dispositions
allowed, and the availability of survivor beneits for children
formed by ART following the death of the intended parent.
Written Agreements
New York decided Kass v. Kass in 1998 following a couple’s
divorce where the ex-wife wanted custody of pre-zygotes.32
The Kass court held that hospital consent forms signed by both
spouses controlled the dispute, that right of privacy in wife’s
reproductive choice was not implicated, and that the pre-zygotes
were not persons and explicitly did not decide whether they
deserved special respect. The Kass court directed that the unused
pre-zygotes be donated to research as directed by the hospital
consent forms and opined that the progenitors rightly made the
128

decision rather than the state.
Washington relied upon a cryopreservation agreement
executed by divorcing spouses in 2002 to enforce a contract
provision for the Loma Linda Fertility Center to thaw preembryos and disallow their further development.33 Husband’s
sperm and donor eggs formed the pre-embryos in vitro. The
Washington Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide if the
pre-embryos were children or whether wife was a progenitor
though not a biological participant.
Texas used new gestational agreement legislation in 2006
to determine that its public policy would permit enforceable
agreements.34
Oregon held that pre-embryos were personal property in
2008 and found no public policy to inform its decision when it
enforced an agreement giving an ex-wife control of pre-embryos
she intended to destroy.35
Florida enforced the terms of a dissolution settlement
agreement in 2008 “that required wife to ‘provide’ [pre-embryos]
to the husband so that he could dispose of them.”36
California decided Findley v. Lee in 2013, upholding a consent
form agreeing to destroy any frozen embryos in the event
of divorce.37 California law requires clearly speciied written
documents on embryo disposition. The Findley court found that
public policy supported enforcement of such contracts and
agreements similar to advance directives and that a balancing
of the parties’ interests constituted a fallback position where no
enforceable agreement existed. The Findley court held that exhusband’s right not to procreate was equal to ex-wife’s right to
procreate, although the court acknowledged that wife underwent
more invasive and repeated procedures than husband. The
Findley court further declined to nominate the pre-embryos
as property or life, and called them “the nascent stage of ive
human lives.”38
Contemporaneous Mutual Consent
Iowa held that its child custody statute did not control the
disposition of pre-embryos in a dissolution where the parties
had signed a valid hospital contract directing continued storage
until certain events occurred requiring authorizations from
both spouses.39 The wife was unable to conceive. Iowa’s public
policy was against enforcing the parties’ agreement in a highly
personal area of reproductive choice and instead applied the
contemporaneous mutual consent principle and made the party
opposing destruction responsible for storage fees.
The McQueen decision is the only other case ordering
contemporaneous mutual consent to resolve a pre-embryo
dispute but as a fallback position given its facts invalidating the
suspect cryopreservation agreement.40
Balancing of Interests
In Davis v. Davis, Tennessee’s seminal case decided a frozen
pre-embryo matter in 1992 where an ex-wife wanted control of
“frozen embryos” for implantation post-divorce.41 The Davis trial
court awarded “custody” to ex-wife giving her the “opportunity
to bring these children to term through implantation.”42 The
Tennessee Supreme Court explicitly repudiated the bright line
rules proposed to resolve the dispute and balanced the interests
of each party.43 The court irst tackled the nomenclature and
mobar.org

“conclude[d] that preembryos [were] not ‘persons’ or ‘property’
but occup[ied] an interim category” entitled “to special respect
because of their potential for human life.”44 It further held that
progenitor agreements are presumed valid and enforceable.
The court discussed that the right of privacy should protect
individuals from government intrusion into the right to and
the right not to procreate and found that the state’s interest in
potential life in pre-embryos is not suicient to justify infringing
upon the progenitor decisions. Ultimately, the court balanced
the interests of the parties and held that ex-husband’s right not
to procreate outweighed ex-wife’s desire to donate the embryos
but noted the decision would be closer if use of the pre-embryos
constituted ex-wife’s last procreative chance.45
Twenty years later in Reber v. Reiss, Pennsylvania determined a
dissolution appeal in 2012 where wife lost her ability to procreate
as a result of cancer treatment. This prompted the spouses to
develop pre-embryos before wife’s treatment began. The spouses
eventually separated and acknowledged that pre-embryos
were marital property.46 In absence of a signed agreement as
to pre-embryo disposition, the Reber court held that wife’s last
procreative chance outweighed husband’s right not to procreate
and noted that, despite wife’s vow not to seek child support, “a
parent cannot bind a child or bargain away that child’s right to
support.”47
Illinois used last procreative chance in 2015 to award preembryos to a woman who had the formed pre-embryos with her
ex-boyfriend after her diagnosis of lymphoma with expected
ovarian failure following planned chemotherapy.48 The Illinois
court found the parties entered into a binding oral agreement
giving control of pre-embryos to the girlfriend, which was not
modiied by the subsequent written medical consent, but also
upheld the trial court’s determination that girlfriend’s interests
in procreation outweighed boyfriend’s interest in avoiding it and
future child support.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court decided A.Z. v. B.Z. in
2000 and based its permanent injunction against ex-wife’s use of
the frozen pre-embryos on a “public policy” against ex-husband’s
“forced procreation.”49 The A.Z. court discounted consent forms

because husband had signed ive blank forms out of six that wife
subsequently completed granting her control of the pre-embryos
in the event of separation or divorce.
In the 2001 case of J.B. v. M.B., New Jersey authorized
destruction of pre-embryos by wife in the absence of any written
agreement directing their disposition where husband’s ability
to procreate was not lost with destruction of the pre-embryos.50
The so-called “J.B. rule” holds that agreements are enforceable
if “entered into [when the IVF process begins] subject to the
right of either party to change of his or her mind [in writing]
up to the point of use or destruction of . . . pre-embryos.”51
Alternatively, the court held that husband could pay fees for
continued storage.
Other countries have struggled with balancing progenitor
interests and pre-embryo disputes. The United Kingdom
declined to award pre-embryos that represented a woman’s last
procreative chance where the progenitor man opposed their
transfer to progenitor woman.52 The Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights found that pre-embryos
do not have a right to life and that European law showed no
consensus on when life begins.
Miscellaneous Actions
Arizona held that a wrongful death action did not lie against
a fertility clinic for negligent destruction of pre-embryos because
it declined to extend personhood to the non-viable pre-embryos
and instead held that pre-embryos occupy an interim position
between person and property due special respect.53 The court
also found that an action in negligence, malpractice, breach
of iduciary duty, or bailment might lie. Such an action was
iled following a storage tank failure at an Ohio fertility clinic
which caused the loss of more than 4,000 frozen embryos and
gametes.54
The United States Supreme Court decision in Astrue v.
Capato held that state law determined whether a mother could

continued on page 151.
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claim Social Security survivor beneits for her twins conceived
posthumously with pre-embryos formed in vitro with her
gametes and those of her deceased husband.55 While not a
dispute over pre-embryos or gametes, the Astrue decision does
inform attorneys counseling progenitors. And newspapers have
reported grandparents seeking control of a dead son’s semen to
make a grandchild.56
In a federal diversity case, the Eastern District of Virginia
denied motions to dismiss California residents’ attempts to
obtain interinstitutional transfer of their pre-zygotes from a
Virginia Medical College to a Los Angeles clinic.57 The husband
and wife had signed an informed consent that provided “three
fates” of the pre-zygotes that did not include the requested
interinstitutional transfer.58
Attorney Recommendations
Pre-embryo disputes fall in the ambit of family law, health
law, and probate law attorneys. Missouri family law attorneys
should prompt their clients about the existence of pre-embryos
or gametes, because forgetfulness, religious convictions, or moral
reasons may prevent spouses from including pre-embryos or
gametes in the listing of property to be divided in dissolution.
Unmarried and married same-sex couples and diferent-sex
couples may have frozen ova, sperm, or pre-embryos. Attorneys
should acquire all the agreements previously executed by
clients using ART to determine any previous agreements as to
disposition of gametes or pre-embryos. Such clients typically sign
multiple documents which might include informed treatment
consent forms, donated gamete agreements, cryopreservation
agreements, and surrogacy contracts (hereinafter collectively
called “Agreements”). Family law attorneys may incorporate the
various IVF or cryopreservation consent options discussed below
into Agreements they might draft or evaluate in the event of
dissolution, death, dispute, or separation between progenitors,
intended parents, or donors.
Missouri ART attorneys who review, draft, and negotiate
collaborative reproduction agreements should carefully explain
the options and consequences, but also emphasize to clients that
the intent expressed in clinical forms typically controls in frozen
gamete or pre-embryo disputes during dissolution or separation,
and upon the death of either or both signors. Alerting clients to
the import of such agreements informs their choices.
Missouri probate attorneys who develop estate planning
documents should designate whether the signatory has or may
have frozen gametes or pre-embryos and the client/s’ wishes as
to the disposition of the gametes or pre-embryos that are then
in existence, planned or not yet planned. The choices include
thawing/destruction, donation to the other intended parent or to
the client/s’ parents/relatives or to other named individuals, and
donation to research. Missouri has no caselaw on parentage of
children formed by IVF or conceived by alternative insemination
after the death of the intended parent who may be the
progenitor or a partner of a progenitor, although wrongful death
actions do lie for a viable fetus.59

However, other courts have considered cases regarding
Social Security beneits for children conceived posthumously
by artiicial insemination with previously frozen semen or by
embryo transfer.60 Both the American Bar Association and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
have developed proposals for use of gametes or pre-embryos
following death of the progenitor. The American Bar Association
(ABA) approved the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology, which basically adopts the “posthumous
conception” provisions of the Revised Uniform Parentage Act
(RUPA).61
The Revised Uniform Parentage Act 2017 delineates
parentage of a deceased intended parent in Section 810:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 812, an
intended parent is not a parent of a child conceived
by assisted reproduction under a gestational surrogacy
agreement if the intended parent dies before the transfer
of a gamete or embryo unless:
(1) the agreement provides otherwise; and
(2) the transfer of a gamete or embryo occurs not later
than [36] months after the death of the intended parent
or birth of the child occurs not later than [45] months
after the death of the intended parent.62
Additionally,
. . . the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property as
to wills and trusts contains the following language:
Unless the language or circumstances indicate the
transferor had a diferent intention, a child of assisted
reproduction is treated for class gift purposes as a child
of a person who consented to function as a parent to
the child and who functioned in that capacity or was
prevented from doing so by an event such as death or
incapacity.
Unless the language or circumstances indicate that the
transferor had a diferent intention, a class gift that has
not yet closed physiologically closes to future entrants on
the distribution date if a beneiciary of the class gift is
then entitled to distribution.63
The guidance in the model act, uniform law, and restatement
revolve around issues of control of gametes and pre-embryos,
parentage, and inheritance. Timing of the start of pregnancy
(conception by artiicial insemination or after embryo transfer)
and expressed written intent are the major determinants.
Importantly, the ABA Model Act, the RUPA, and the
Restatement Third of Property Law are informative but not
controlling; Missouri has not enacted the RUPA or the ABA
Model Act. Thus, while not controlling in Missouri, these
documents do inform probate practitioners of what might
constitute national best practices. Importantly, it is state law
that determines the availability of Social Security beneits for
children conceived posthumously.64
Health law attorneys representing reproductive medicine
and cryopreservation facilities must know that IVF centers are
@MoBarNews
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progenitor or a partner of a progenitor, although wrongful death
actions do lie for a viable fetus.59
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have developed proposals for use of gametes or pre-embryos
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(ABA) approved the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology, which basically adopts the “posthumous
conception” provisions of the Revised Uniform Parentage Act
(RUPA).61
The Revised Uniform Parentage Act 2017 delineates
parentage of a deceased intended parent in Section 810:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 812, an
intended parent is not a parent of a child conceived
by assisted reproduction under a gestational surrogacy
agreement if the intended parent dies before the transfer
of a gamete or embryo unless:
(1) the agreement provides otherwise; and
(2) the transfer of a gamete or embryo occurs not later
than [36] months after the death of the intended parent
or birth of the child occurs not later than [45] months
after the death of the intended parent.62
Additionally,
. . . the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property as
to wills and trusts contains the following language:
Unless the language or circumstances indicate the
transferor had a diferent intention, a child of assisted
reproduction is treated for class gift purposes as a child
of a person who consented to function as a parent to
the child and who functioned in that capacity or was
prevented from doing so by an event such as death or
incapacity.
Unless the language or circumstances indicate that the
transferor had a diferent intention, a class gift that has
not yet closed physiologically closes to future entrants on
the distribution date if a beneiciary of the class gift is
then entitled to distribution.63
The guidance in the model act, uniform law, and restatement
revolve around issues of control of gametes and pre-embryos,
parentage, and inheritance. Timing of the start of pregnancy
(conception by artiicial insemination or after embryo transfer)
and expressed written intent are the major determinants.
Importantly, the ABA Model Act, the RUPA, and the
Restatement Third of Property Law are informative but not
controlling; Missouri has not enacted the RUPA or the ABA
Model Act. Thus, while not controlling in Missouri, these
documents do inform probate practitioners of what might
constitute national best practices. Importantly, it is state law
that determines the availability of Social Security beneits for
children conceived posthumously.64
Health law attorneys representing reproductive medicine
and cryopreservation facilities must know that IVF centers are
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largely a self-regulated industry with no federal and few state
laws governing them.65 The Food and Drug Administration
regulation of certain human cells, including gametes, to prevent
the transmission of communicable and infectious diseases is not
addressed in this article.66
Best practices for any IVF center should require execution of
an informed consent form/s and cryopreservation agreement by
donors and intended parents such that they are informed of their
rights and options. This includes length of storage; thawing with
destruction; donation to each other, to other family members,
to another family, or to science; and potential triggers for such
options, such as length of time, pregnancy, death, or divorce.
Importantly, a properly executed document should lay out their
intentions.
These sorts of agreements walk a ine balance among state
public policy, individual constitutional rights, and contractual
rights. While courts may or may not force a progenitor to
procreate against his/her wishes or to pay for frozen storage
indeinitely, IVF center contracts may provide options to occur
speciically upon a speciied length of time, or upon death,
divorce, a change of heart, successful pregnancy/ies, or other
events. The contract can specify storage fees from a progenitor
who wants to preserve pre-embryos against the other progenitor’s
wishes for donation or destruction. A contract may not bargain
away child support to a party opposing embryo transfer, as the
right of support belongs to the child.
Other provisions that IVF or cryopreservation clinical forms
should contain include: distinguishing oral or written agreements
between parties with contracts or forms executed with IVF/
cryopreservation centers; the center’s deinition of abandoned
gametes/pre-embryos and their policies upon abandonment,
including the center’s options to thaw and destroy or donate
abandoned gametes/pre-embryos to science; the center’s policy
upon its own closure; and the center’s liability for lost, misused,
or accidentally destroyed gametes/pre-embryos. Abandonment
of pre-embryos has been deined as couples not paying for
continued storage of their pre-embryos or gametes.67
Health law attorneys should consider inclusion in their
Agreements the rule developed in J.B.that pre-embryo
agreements are enforceable if entered into when the IVF process
begins, subject to the right of either party to signify a change of
his/her mind in writing up to the point of use or destruction of
pre-embryos.68 Attorneys would also be wise to include a caveat
that the efect of §§ 1.205, 188.010, and 188.015 or subsequent
legislation as discussed below may inluence clinic conduct where
thawing, destroying, or scientiic use of pre-embryos might
constitute a crime. However, the McQueen deinition of preembryos as property of a special character may inluence IVF
facility concerns regarding criminal penalties attaching around
the disposition of frozen pre-embryos.
None of the courts in the United States cases on pre-embryo
disputes found that pre-embryos constituted human beings,
although Louisiana law provides that an IVF ovum is a juridical
person, and New Mexico law requires that an IVF embryo be
stored until transferred or donated.69
While McQueen’s case was on appeal, she approached
Rep. John McCaherty, who unsuccessfully introduced House
Bill 2558 during the 2016 Missouri legislative session.70 HB
2558 would have directed courts to render custody decisions
152

for preimplantation frozen embryos utilizing certain criteria
and included a best interest of the embryo factor.71 Rep. Mike
Moon introduced House Joint Resolution 53 in the 2018
legislative session to hold a general/special election to amend the
constitution to declare life in every preborn human child at every
stage of development from the moment of conception.72 This
measure also failed to gain legislative approval.
Scientists argue that such laws, and perhaps the Missouri
proposal, would not just prevent abortion and the embryonic
stem cell research that might constitute the motivation behind
such laws, but also signiicantly restrict infertility treatments
including IVF, cryopreservation of pre-embryos and gametes,
and treatment to remove life-threatening ectopic pregnancies.73
Given that more than 2,000 Missourians utilized assisted
reproduction more than ive years ago, legislation that restricts
ART treatment for infertility would afect many Missourians.
Conclusion
Assisted reproductive technologies are widely used, including
in Missouri. The McQueen decision makes pre-embryos property
deserving special respect and subject to marital division.
While the McQueen decision explicitly did not decide if a valid
agreement about pre-embryo disposition was enforceable in
Missouri, the court notes other states which are enforcing such
agreements. And most state courts agree that efectuating the
intent of the progenitors is the best outcome in a dispute over
pre-embryos. To that end, lawyers should carefully craft clinic
treatment consent forms for gamete collection, alternative
insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, and
cryopreservation agreements; agreements for gamete donation,
embryo transfer, and surrogacy; and all probate instruments such
that the intent of all relevant parties is clearly explained and
memorialized.
Importantly, attorneys should guarantee that every party to
any such agreement is represented by independent counsel, for
to do otherwise allows a party to act in ignorance in a matter of
constitutional signiicance, to allege ignorance or undue inluence
in a dispute, or to lodge a complaint against an attorney for
conlict of interest or representing one perhaps more powerful
party to an agreement where the other party goes unadvised. A
waiver of conlict agreement is appropriate where a couple hires
the same attorney to represent each of them.
Best practices for Missouri family, health, and probate
attorneys would problem solve issues presented in decisions
made in other states and by the U.S. Supreme Court as well
as provisions found in model and uniform laws. These issues
commonly include property division in dissolution or separation
or other triggers, motivation for ART participation, last
procreative chance, beliefs regarding destruction of pre-embryos,
and progenitor and intended parent intent for gametes and preembryos following death.
As McQueen noted, science does indeed outpace legislation.
Nonetheless, many Missourians are utilizing ART and scientists
are now gene-editing human embryo cells via CRISPR to
“correct defective genes that cause inherited diseases.”74
Legislation to adopt RUPA 2017 would promote the welfare
of the thousands of Missourians utilizing assisted reproduction
to form a family and the potential to spare would-be children
inherited diseases.
mobar.org
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